In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.
History

Thu, 13 Feb 2025 00:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-284

Fri, 08 Nov 2024 16:00:00 +0000


Tue, 22 Oct 2024 01:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate


Mon, 21 Oct 2024 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 21 Oct 2024 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.
Title f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2024-10-21T12:14:09.171Z

Updated: 2024-12-19T09:27:10.188Z

Reserved: 2024-09-30T16:00:12.959Z

Link: CVE-2024-47740

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2024-10-21T12:59:22.941Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2024-10-21T13:15:04.103

Modified: 2024-11-08T16:15:27.477

Link: CVE-2024-47740

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2024-10-21T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2024-47740 - Bugzilla